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Domestic Gloom and Foreign Optimism? 
Some analysts have noted that domestic 
investors seem skeptical about the Reagan 
economic program, while foreign investors 
seem highly encouraged by it. For evidence 
of  domestic pessimism, they point to the 
recent decline in bond prices (rise in long-
term interest rates). For evidence of foreign 
optimism, they point to the strength of  the 
dollar in the foreign-exchange markets-a 
surprising development when it is realized 
that the dollarwas dramatically weaker in 
one earlier episode (1977-78) of rising long-
term rates. 
What reasons can we find for this surprising 
dichotomy? According to one view, domestic 
investors see the Administration's program as 
being inflationary-as leadingto higher long-
term interest rates. And at the same time, 
foreign investors look  to the United States as a 
center of political and economic stability 
and, perhaps equally important, a respecter 
of property rights. Foreigners thus become 
increasingly attracted to the dollar in the 
wake of  the political and military dislocations 
in the Middle East, the threat of  a Soviet attack 
on Poland, and other events such as the 
recent French election. 
Flaw in argument 
This explanation for a simultaneously strong 
international dollar and weak domestic bond 
market is consistent with the evidence, and 
provides a reasonable explanation of recent 
developments. However, it does have one 
major flaw. One would expect a rise in U.S. 
inflation expectations (as in 1977-78) to be 
associated with both a rise in long-term bond 
rates and a decline in the international value 
of  the dollar. After all, most analysts now 
recognize that a rise in inflation will 
depreciate the real purchasing power of 
dollar-denominated securities. Thus, a 
massive change in peoples' expectations of 
foreign risks and domestic stabi I  ity wou Id be 
required to overcome the depressing effects 
of  rising inflation on the international value of 
the dollar. 
At the logical level, the explanation is clearly 
ad hoc-an explanation which is unique to 
the circumstances at hand. But a more 
general explanation is available, based on the 
proposition that the variation in bond rates is 
primarily dependent on variations in long-
run inflation expectations, while the foreign-
exchange value of the dollar is primarily 
dependent on variations in real  interest rates. 
A bond investor purchases a fixed stream of 
income over the next twenty to thirty years. 
To evaluate the present value (and therefore 
the price) of that income stream, domestic 
bond-market participants make explicit 
calculations about what will happen to the 
domestic value of the dollar, i.e., the 
expected rate of inflation. But the foreign-
exchange market, where the international 
value of the dollar is determined, does not 
respond to inflation expectations in the same 
way. The international investor in dollar 
securities will be compensated for a higher 
expected rate of inflation by a propor-
tionately higher nominal interest rate, which 
will leave him indifferent to holding 
additional dollar assets.1 However, the 
international investor will respond positively 
to a change in real interest rates. If real interest 
rates are higher in the United States than 
abroad, investors will try to buy more dollar 
assets, and in the process will raise the 
exchange value of  the dollar. (See ou r Weekly 
Letter of September 12, 1980.) 
Bond market and inflation 
Most of the dramatic movement in bond 
yields in the last two years has been inflation-
1 The exchange rate will adjust to actual inflation along 
the lines described in the theory of purchasing-power 
parity. The current discussion concerns the financial-
market effects on the spot exchange rate, which 
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related, as we can see (Chart 1) from 
comparing current stock and bond yields. 
(See our Weekly Letter of June 5,1981.) The 
stock yield, because it need not incorporate 
an explicit inflation premi"um, is in effect a 
real rate of return. And the real  returns on 
stocks and bonds, while certainly not 
identical, have historically moved together 
over the business cycle. Thus the unusual 
stability in the stock yield for the past four 
years provides strong, if indirect, evidence of 
the stability of the non-inflation component 
of  the bond yield. 
Inflation will affect the bond yield not only 
because of  a rise in inflation expectations, but 
also because of a rise in inflation risk, which 
is related to the degree of uncertainty with 
which future inflation premiums are 
incorporated into the bond yield. If inflation 
expectations turn out to be too low (a 
common problem in the last ten years), then 
the investor runs the risk of suffering a loss on 
his bond investments. This risk is one-sided if 
inflation is less than expected and the bond 
can be "called" back by the corporation. 
Because high rates of inflation are associated 
with variable inflation, inflation premiums 
and inflation risks have tended to move 
together. 
One can only speculate about the reasons for 
the major rise in inflation expectations and 
risk in the last two years. Certainly the actual 
rate of inflation has not risen dramatically-
just the reverse. As measured by the 
consumer-price index, the inflation rate 
declined from 13.3 percent in 1979 to 12.4 
percent in 1980, and then to an 8.5-percent 
annual rate in the first half  of 1981. However, 
the inflation-induced rise in bond yields may 
reflect a perceived lack of Federal Reserve 
"credibility" with respect to achieving long-
run money-growth targets. (See our Weekly 
Letter of  June 5, 1981.) 
Investors seem to forecast future inflation on 
the basis of  what  they expect to happen in the 
future growth of  the money supply. If, over 
the past four years, investors had forecast the 
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money supply and inflation on the basis of 
announced money targets, they would have 
been too low because the Federal Reserve 
overshot some of its targets in each of these 
years. But investors wou  Id have been about 
right if  they had forecast money growth on the 
basis of growth in the national debt, because 
the two series have almost always moved 
together. Wall Streeters see the Reagan 
budget program as implying rapid growth in 
the national debt for the next four years, and 
so they forecast rapid growth in money and 
inflation. They are not convinced by the fact 
that the (M-1 B) money supply has fallen 
below target so far this year, because it did the 
same in the comparable period of 1980 and 
yet overshot the top of its target range for the 
year as a whole. 
The recent rise in long-term bond yields may 
be more than proportional to the rise in 
inflation expectations, because bond 
purchasers face additional risks if  their 
inflation forecast turns out to be too low. On 
the other side of  the market, large corporate 
borrowers may be reluctant without a "call 
provision" to pay an interest rate which 
includes an inflation premium largerthan the 
expected rate of inflation. Moreover, bond 
dealers may find the cost of holding 
inventories excessively risky, so thatthe bond 
market becomes thinner and more volatile in 
the wake of any reduction of inventories. 
Indeed, as a result of high bond rates and a 
thin bond market, many corporate borrowers 
have (at least temporarily) shifted to the 
short-term end of the market, especially to 
bank loans. 
Bank loans and short-term rates 
Over the last 15 years, bank loans have 
averaged 22 percent of total funds raised by 
corporations. However, the proportion has 
varied considerably over time, because many 
corporations consider banks as their residual 
source of funds. Yet unlike other suppliers of 
shorter-term funds, banks have the unique 
ability to increase the money supply because 
they increase deposits, at least temporarily, as 
they service loans. This factor has had Percent 
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different consequences before and after the 
October 1979 shift in Federal Reserve 
operating procedures (see chart 2). 
Prior to October 1979, the Federal Reserve 
tried to keep the Fed funds rate within a 
narrow target range, so that an unexpected 
increase in bank loans, deposits and the 
money supply would be accommodated by 
an increase in bank reserves. This 
accommodation meant that short-term 
interest rates could not respond quickly to 
changes in bank loans. However, the 
resulting increase in money would eventually 
stimulate the economy, and raise interest 
rates after a year or so. 
After October 1979, the Fed has focused 
instead on short-run control of  bank reserves, 
so that an increase in bank loans and deposits 
would not be accommodated to the same 
extent as before by an increase in bank 
reserves. Interest rates thus have moved 
immediately to equate the supply and 
demand for bank loans, with the size of that 
response depending upon the strength of 
corporate preference to meet their short-run 
needs from banks. If corporations see 
substantial advantages to the use of bank 
loans, then a relatively large increase in rates 
will be needed to discourage them from 
borrowing. Consequently, Federal Reserve 
attempts to control money via bank reserves 
will lead to a rather sharp movement in 
short-term rates when corporations decide 
(for whatever reason) to increase the share of 
funds raised in the form of bank loans. 
Exchange rates and interest rates 
A rise in the real interest rate, and not in the 
nominal interest rate, affects the exchange 
value of the dollar (see the Weekly Letter of 
September 12, 1980). Only a rise in real 
interest rates induces foreigners to purchase 
more dollar-denominated assets. 
If the rise in rates is due to inflation 
expectations, there is no higher real  rate of 
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return for buying dollar assets, and therefore 
no capital inflow to affect exchange rates. 
Since October 1979, much of the movement 
in the dollar's exchange value C<;in  be 
explained by the unusual variation in U.s. 
real short-term interest rates (see Chart 3). 
Summary: policy dilemma 
In summary, tour factors help explain the 
phenomenon of a weak bond market and a 
strong dollar. First, long-run inflation 
expectations are not based on Federal 
Reserve money-supply targets, but rather on 
an expected growth rate of the national debt. 
Second, market participants widely expect 
thatthe national debt will increase, leadingto 
future increases in the money supply. The 
resulting rise in long-run inflation 
expectations and inflation risks reduces the 
viability of the bond market as a source of 
long-term funds, and increases the share of 
funds raised in the form of bank loans. Third, 
banks provide a unique link between credit 
and money markets, because an increase in 
bank loans induces increases in deposits and 
the money supply. The Fed must resist this 
credit-induced increase in money if it is to 
stay within its long-run money targets. 
Fourth, the resulting rise in real short-term 
interest rates leads to a temporary rise in the 
value of the dollar in the foreign-exchange 
market. 
When will interest rates come down? The 
pressure will be relieved when the market 
begins to forecast money growth and 
inflation on the basis of the Fed's targets, or 
alternatively when the market sees a 
reduction in the size of the government 
deficit. That eventuality would reduce 
inflation expectations, and would revive the 
bond market as a viable source of long-term 
financing. The resulting reduction in 
corporate demand for bank loans would then 
make it possible for the Fed to hit its money-
supply targets without involving such high 
short-term interest rates. 
Michael W. Keran .  J!lI?:)  'O:>SPU1?J:i  Ul!S 
(,;S'L  'ON IIWlBd 
OIVd 
:J9V  ISOd 's'n 
11VW SSV1:) ISMI:I 
SS\fl~  J.S~I:J 
u018U!LJ5PM • LJPln  • uo8cuO •  ppPllaN  •  oLJPPI 
!lPMPH  •  PlUJOJ!lPJ  PUOZlJV·  P>j5PIV 
CD:> ~<§  ~  ~  W\2? JJ d[ \ill\2?CS 
~  CD:>  ~  W\2? C@J 
@~JJ@<§@CQI TI\2?JJ@l}S)@d[ 
{1 \ill~m{1JJ~cdI~@ ~~JJ~~~~CQI 
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
Amount 
Outstanding 
7/22/81 
150,270 
129,166 
38,948 
53,264 
22,948 
1,391 
6,208 
14,896 
39,055 
27J62 
30,258 
82,968 
74J13 
33A81 
Weekended 
7/22/81 
n.a. 
80 
n.a. 
Change 
from 
7/15/81 
82 
82 
305 
134 
9 
- 188 
18 
- 18 
-4,141 
-2,113 
- 69 
155 
138 
344 
Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
12,612  9.2 
13,234  11.4 
5,574  16.7 
6,133  13.0 
- 873  - 3.7 
391  39.1 
106  - 1.7 
- 512  3.3 
- 3A37  - 8.1 
- 3,520  -11.3 
1,220  4.2 
20,856  33.6 
20,922  38.9 
11,188  50.2 
Weekended  Comparable 
7/15/81  year -ago period 
n.a.  50 
72  30 
n.a.  - 80 
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